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THE ROLE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS)
IN DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECOVERY EFFORTS:
HISTORICAL, CURRENT, AND FUTURE
Dennis Vincenzi*, David C. lsont, Brent A. Terwilliger*
A wide range of legislation has been proposed or put into place that restricts the use of
unmanned systems. These actions by legislators and regulators will stifle the growth of this
technology and the associated surrounding industry. The largest obstacle to the
proliferation of UAS in the U.S. is the FAA. The FAA has designated the location of six
test sites that are anticipated to allow for less restrictive and formative research to assess
the technologies that the FAA has claimed need to exist in order to integrate UAS into the
NAS . Further complicating the adoption of UAS for beneficent causes is the plethora of
local and state legislation and regulation. Whilst many state restrictions do have built-in
caveats to potentially allow for disaster support utilizing UAS , not all are so explicit. All
of these actions make the adoption ofUAS in disaster areas more complex and may sway
associated agencies away from purchasing UAS for these uses in the future. This research
outlines historical uses ofUAS to provide basis for the adoption in disaster relief. Examples
of past use of unmanned systems in exigent event response are provided including posthurricane rescue, wild fire monitoring, and landslide disaster relief. An example of missed
opportunities with UAS, the Boston Marathon bombing is also outlined. Current UAS
usage in first response is explained including types of platforms and sensors that show
promise in such operations. Future considerations for UAS adoption in disaster efforts are
outlined.

BACKGROUND
The presence of unmanned vehicles conjures up images of combat capable killer drones
armed with a variety of missiles whose sole purpose is to kill and destroy. In reality, most of the
technology developed for unmanned aircraft is designed for intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), and this technology can be easily adapted and applied toward peacetime uses
that benefit civilian populations. The major delays in the implementation of unmanned aircraft
systems within the United States has been on the regulation side of the house with concerns
revolving around safety, integration into the National Airspace System (NAS), and privacy issues.
The development and degree of sophistication of technology related to unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS) has been unparalleled in the past decade, and the realization of potential beneficial uses of
these systems has grown at a phenomenal rate.
The introduction of any new technology or procedure into the NAS requires a
comprehensive safety analysis before the FAA can allow the change. This is understandable since
the mission of the FAA is to regulate and oversee all aspects of American civil aviation, and has
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built its heritage and reputation on promoting safety within the NAS and throughout the world.
The FAA has the authority to issue special authorizations for use, but these authorizations are
limited. The current access to the NAS, outside of special-use airspace, is through the certificate
of authorization process or the experimental airworthiness process.
One of the issues with obtaining a CoA for legal operation of a UAS in disaster response
and recovery efforts is the need to provide a detailed description of the intended flight operation,
including the classification of the airspace to be used. This information is often not specifically
known prior to the occurrence of the disaster. For example, in disaster and recovery operations ,
many times the location and classification of airspace to be used is not known prior to the
occurrence of the event. Additionally, the extent of local, county, state, and federal response
agencies involved is not known until the occurrence of the event. Not knowing this infonnation ,
which is required as part of the CoA application process, makes it almost impossible to obtain
permission from the FAA to legally operate a UAS as part of a disaster response and recovery effort
even though use of this technology can easily provide critical information to the agencies
responsible for search and rescue operations (SAR) and damage assessment.
Privacy issues are also a major concern for the American public. The United States
Constitution, specifically the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, prohibits
unreasonable search and seizures and requires that any action of this nature be supported by a
judicial review showing probable cause to conduct such activity. UAS technology now provides
access to areas that were once not accessible by law enforcement, thereby raising the question of
whether use of UAS technology by law enforcement agencies is legal, and whether existing laws
and regulations should be modified to address the use of UAS technology and restrict the use of
that technology on citizens of the United States.
Recent actions by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has generated a great deal
of public interest and discussion in the area of privacy related to the use of UASs, and this public
interest and discussion has resulted in some states passing legislation restricting the use.
Unfortunately, there is no consensus as to what UAS legislation should include or what restrictions
on use of UAS technology is reasonable. Most legislation passes a combination of restrictions on
the use of UAS technology and image capturing capability while allowing some legal use and
1
exemptions for legitimate law enforcement and commercial uses.

HISTORICAL USE AND BENEFITS
The role and usage of UAS has grown significantly in the U.S. since their adoption as
aerodynamic models, test beds, and aerial munitions in the early years of aviation (i.e., 1890s to
1918). 2 Eventually, after the baseline technology was advanced, the roles of UAS were expanded
to include use as aerial targets, weapons delivery platfonns, communications relays, target
designators, and ISR gathering assets. 3· 4 While the application of UAS has steadily increased over
the years, the full extent of reliability and functionality was not realized until the 1990s. 5 During
operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, U.S. forces flew a significant number of missions using
UAS, which represented the first wide-scale use of this technology. 6 ' 7· 8 These aircraft ranged in
size from the group one sized FQM-151A Pointer, launched by hand, up to the group three RQ-2
Pioneer, requiring specialized support equipment for launch and recovery. 9
The use of UAS in military conflicts of the 1990s supported the capture of time sensitive
intelligence and data that could be used by military leadership in their decision making process,
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without subjecting a manned aviator to the risk of flying in an operational theater. 10 Information
could be obtained faster, from dangerous environments, with less risk to valuable assets and pilots.
The result of this wide-scale use of UAS demonstrated their value, leading to the investment of
funding to further develop and refine the associated technology and operational processes. 11
Advancement in the underlying and related technology, coupled with need, has led to the
identification of wider application and utility of UAS . 12 As the increased or improved capabilities
associated with new technologies or the boundaries of existing technologies are discerned, the
utility and capability of UAS also increase. 13 While the majority of historical UAS application has
stemmed from military/tactical uses, the technology has migrated to the civilian and commercial
sectors. The resulting benefits of such migration include the ability to provide increased security,
productivity, and efficiency, enhanced mobility and response, and improved access to perform
disaster assessment, infrastructure inspection, and environmental protection. 14• 15

APPLICATION ISSUES
Historical, Current, and Missed Applications

The application of UAS for the sake of saving lives and assessing damage has been advocated
my numerous government organizations and researchers. 16 • 17 While there have been several high
profile cases where UAS have been used in disaster relief in other countries, emergency responders
in the U.S. have been hesitant to use them in such cases due to regulatory and legislative
. .
. 11 y.
restnct10ns
. is· 19 Th ere are however, some examples of historical and current usage domestica
Also, UAS stakeholders have provided examples of missed cases in which UAS could have
dramatically assisted in emergency events.
California Wild Fires. On multiple occasions in the past, the State of California has utilized
UAS in attempts to monitor and fight wildfires. In 2011, a UAS was used to map fire activity and
5
damage. As recently as 2013, a Predator UAS from the 163rd Wing of the California Air National
Guard was used to provide real-time imagery to firefighters in order to assist in planning and
direction of assets in a 301 square mile fire within Yosemite National Park. 20 Of course, military
platforms do not face the restrictions with which operations that smaller, non-military UAS users
must conform. In fact, other California UAS operators have been cautious to launch their platforms
even in face of threatening fires because of FAA restrictions.2 1
Post-Hurricane Uses. Two UASs from the University of South Florida were deployed following
the landfall of hurricane Katrina in storm damaged communities in Mississippi. A four foot long
fixed wing platform was used to provide an overview of damage. A helicopter UAS was used to
zoom in on a smaller scale, looking at rooftops and within windows. This permitted first responders
to confinn there were no survivors in the area threated by the Pearl River flood waters. This allowed
rescuers to more effectively deploy assets to other locations .22 Three days following the landfall of
hurricane Wilma, a micro UAS was coupled with a unmanned water surface vehicle to assess
damage to seawalls, piers and to identify submerged debris. 2 3
Washington Landslide. In March of 2014, a massive landslide occurred burying a community
near Arlington, Washington. In addition to the devastation brought by the slide, debris blocked a
river potentially making things worse with the threat of massive flooding. To assess the damage,
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the status of the river, and to look for survivors a small UAS was deployed. The system was able
to provide real-time data to rescue personnel through video feed and by taking photographs. 24

Boston Bombing. Although there are many cases in which UAS use for disaster relief could have
been helpful, one of those receiving a tremendous amount of media attention was the bombing of
the Boston Marathon in 2013. According to Clark, ·' Police, lawmakers and advocates are
questioning whether police drones could have found the suspects faster. " 25 Numerous experts and
law enforcement personnel believe that the manhunt for those responsible would have been more
timely and organized with the inclusion of UAS . Moreover, if UAS were able to monitor such
events, they may act as a deterrent and, in the worst case, assist in identifying guilty parties. 26 · 27
Issues Preventing or Limiting Use
The primary restriction to UAS operations for any non-personal (hobby) or larger platfom1s
comes from the FAA. Currently, any other type of UAS operation - academic, law enforcement ,
commercial, disaster relief - is limited by FAA mandates. If an individual wants to operate a nonpersonal UAS, they must apply for a Certificate of Authorization (COA) with which the FAA has
not been reliably forthcoming. As of March 2014, only public agencies are eligible to apply for a
COA. Alternatively, a user can apply for a special airworthiness certificate but these provide limited
scope of use. Thus it is impossible for first responders to "legally" utilize UAS in their effo11s
except in the case of a sponsoring military agency. Yet this means that disaster responders have
limited flexibility about quickly and effectively dealing with time sensitive events. 28
Additional state and local legislation has surfaced to limit UAS usage. As of 2014, 43 states had
considered or passed VAS-restrictive legislation. More than 70% of the passed legislation allow
provisions for UAS use in exigent circumstances such as emergency response. Additionally, more
than 80% of those passed permitted UASs when a warrant was issued. Many municipalities have
also brought forth constraints to UAS. Charlottesville, Virginia has a "drone-free zone" and a
moratorium on the purchase of UAS by the city. Other cities and counties have adopted restrictions
on weaponized UAS, UAS prohibitions, and limits to purchases of UAS by government or law
enforcement. However, many of these motions have exemptions for UAS being flown for exigent
circumstances. 29
More resistance to UAS adoption stems from privacy concerns. When the City of Seattle
attempted to add UAS to their police force, protesters forced the Chief of Police to abandon the
pursuit indefinitely. 30 There has been a significant amount of public concern voiced about UAS
data collection, even if unintentional, during their use even in disaster relief or other virtuous tasks.
This has prompted legislators and local representatives to pursue the aforementioned legislative
actions. Also, prominent groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Code
Pink have been vocal about privacy protection from UAS. Even the FAA has faced pressure about
addressing the privacy issue, which they then included privacy protection language in the recently
released test site plan which will allow UAS testing for their integration into the National Airspace
System. 31

CURRENT DISASTER RESPONSE APPLICATION
Uses of UAS for the civilian sector are numerous and the list is growing daily. The trend
in military UAS applications is to replace manned missions that are typically classified as "dull,
dirty and dangerous. 32 The terms "dull, dirty and dangerous" not only describe a significant part
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of warfare activity, but can also be applied to many tasks where UAS technology can be most
useful, including but not limited to things such as pipeline monitoring, agricultural and crop-dusting
applications, wildfire aerial assessment, and disaster response and relief efforts.
UAS technology is uniquely suited for ISR operations due to a wide variety of sensors and
payloads available for military and civilian use. Sensors are usually designed to collect information
or data from the aircraft or environment, whereas payloads are usually designed to leave the aircraft.
Examples of sensors may be video cameras, infrared cameras, multispectral cameras, or aircraft
sensors (altitude, airspeed, temperature, etc.), whereas examples of payloads may be crop-dusting
pesticides, water for fighting fires, or as is the case with military applications, armament. However,
payloads can also refer to a collection of sensors combined into one unit such as a suite of sensors
(infrared cameras, high resolution video cameras, etc.). Today, the term sensor and payload are
often used interchangeably. 33
One of the most redeeming features of a UAS used in disaster response and recovery efforts
is the ability of the UAS to transmit information from sensors and payloads back to the ground
control station (GCS) for processing. The ability of the UASs to fulfill their missions depends in
large part upon the communications link between the UAS and the GCS. 34· 35 These two factors
allow UAS units (UAS and GCS) to enter an affected area quickly while leaving the human
component behind in a safe location to process information and coordinate response and recovery
activities. Sending the UAS into the hazardous area to perform the missions related to damage
assessment and search for stranded individuals in need of assistance can be performed much sooner
than normally possible if the technology were not present and available. This allows enhanced
situation awareness for rescue and response personnel and pinpoint focusing of resources where
needed instead of blanket coverage and inefficient rescue operations.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE APPLICATION
There are several significant concerns and challenges that may restrict the operation and
application of UAS to support disaster recovery and response. These concerns and challenges
include gaining access to airspace, 36 ensuring safety and privacy, 37 and optimizing data capture and
analysis. Until these issues are better understood, with possible methods to mitigate identified, the
potential of UAS to support disaster recovery and response efforts may not be fully achievable.
A few recent research topics associated with UAS technology exhibit potential
applicability and benefit to resolve some of these issues. These subjects include unmanned system
teaming, 38 improved algorithms (e.g., compression, data-scanning, non-iterative, segmentation,
classification, and labelling), 39 · 40 · 41 adaptive training, 42 and improved automation. 43 · 44 Further
exploring these avenues of research may provide additional capabilities and performance to better
support the future execution of UAS disaster recovery and response missions.

CONCLUSIONS
The adoption of UAS in disaster and recovery efforts shows excellent promise to assist
first responders to support in the most comprehensive possible ways. By giving these individuals
difficult to attain or presently unavailable data, first responders can apply UAS to expedite their
efforts in order to save property and lives in a safe, efficient, and effective manner.
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Unfortunately, the current regulatory environment hampers their use. It is critical that UAS
stakeholders continue their efforts to attempt to provide regulating agencies and legislators the
extremely beneficial attributes of UAS in the ability to provide critical data to disaster and recovery
efforts. Examples such as the Boston Marathon bombing point to missed opportunities that could
have benefitted from the inclusion of UASs.
Once the regulatory issues are resolved and the FAA provides a framework for reasonable
use of UAS, such should allow for constructive and beneficent UAS operations such as those that
assist first response efforts. The potential of UAS to help in disaster and recovery efforts cannot be
underestimated and theoretically can revolutionize the data collection and observation capabilities
in situations currently handicapped by the lack thereof. UAS have the capability to transform the
way disaster relief is handled - let us hope that the obstacles are removed so that rescue personnel
can leverage their abilities to save lives.
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National Aeronauucs and Space Administration

UAS Integration into the NAS:

,..-

Phase 1 Human Systems' Integration Activities ...

Human Systems Integration (HSI) Overview
•

Objectives:
I.
II.

•

Develop GCS guidelines to operate in the
NAS
Develop a prototype display suite within
an existing GCS to:
1. Serve as a test bed for UAS pilot
procedures and displays
2. Provide a database to support
guidelines development
3. Provide an instantiated proof of
concept for those guidelines

SIMULATION

INF"CRMATtCN

EXPERIMENTS

RE~UIREMENTS

Technical Activities:
o.

o.

Information requirements analysis to
identify the minimum GCS information
to operate in the NAS
Simulation experiments to examine:
•D UAS pilot performance under various
operating conditions and GCS
configurations
•D The impact of nominal and offnnmin~1 11/\C

l"'H"\Ot"'":)tiAnc

An

J\jy
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PROTOTYPE

Cli C: S

Human Systems Integration
Seamlessly
interact with SSI

Efficiently manage
contingency operations w/o
disr
·
AS

Coordinate with ATC
- w/o increase to
ATC workload

RTCA
provide
data and
proof of
concept for
"""""........,,.......__..~~~--.~ GCS

Ensure
operator
knowledge of
complex
airspace and

Human
factors
guidelines
for GCS
operation in
the NAS

Traffic information for
situation awareness and
self-separation (well clear)

3

~ • .i~-

Information Requirements Analysis
•

Parallel Information Requirements Analyses:
o Phase of Flight
o Functional (e.g ., aviate/control , manage, avoid , etc.)
o Evaluation of existing Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)

•

Combined into a single, searchable database
o Primary reference for development of prototype GCS displays and
guidelines
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.......;;:;;;_~~~~~-U-A_S~P_i_lo_t_P_e_r_fo_r_m_a_n_c_e~~~~-- ~
•

Key Issues for UAS Pilot Performance:
o Ability to perform comparably to pilots of manned aircraft (transparent to
ATC)
o Traffic display elements that support ability to maintain self-separation
o Design of, and levels of automation in, command and control/navigation
interfaces

•

Simulation Experiments Examining UAS Pilot Performance:
o Part Task Simulation 1 - Baseline Compliance
• Fern, L., Kenny, C .. Shively, R. J.. & John son. W. (2012). UAS integration int o t he
NAS: an examination of baseline compliance in the current airsp ace system.
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 56th Annual Mee ting .
Boston, MA. October 22-26 .

o Measured Response A - Response to ATC Clearances
• Shively, R. J.. Vu, K. P. L., & Buker, T. J. (2013). Unm anned a ircraft system
response to air traffic control clearances : measured response . Proceedings of the
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 57th Annual Meeting. San Diego. CA.
October 1-3.

o Full Mission Simulation 1 - GCS Control Mode Interfaces
• Rorie, R. c .. Fern , L. , & Shively, R. J. (submitted). UAS measured response: the
effect of GCS control mode interfaces on pilot ability to comply with ATC
s
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UAS Pilot Performance
Part Task Simulation 1: An Examination of Baseline
>- Objectives:
Compliance
1. Examine baseline compliance of UAS operations in the current airspace system
2. Examine the effects of introducing a traffic display into a UAS ground control
station on pilot performance. workload and situation awareness
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Main results/conclusions:
• ATC reported appropriate and immediate compliance by UAS pilots, and sufficient
knowledge of the airspace and required procedures
• No effect of traffic display on maintenance of separation in Class A airspace
• Potential benefits to both Pilots and Controllers when a traffic display is present in the
GCS
• significantly higher pilot SA on several dimensions
• sjgpjfic3gt!)' lg>orpr >Mgrkload fgr pj!gts >Nhep cgmm11gjc3tipg 101jth AK
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UAS Pilot Performance
Measured Response A: UAS Response to ATC Clearances
~

Objectives:
1.
2.
3.

Demonstrate the ability to capture measured response (MR) components
Measure UAS pilot verbal response and execution latencies in response to
standard ATC commands and clearances
Obtain ATC acceptability ratings of these latencies
Clearance lY••

······-··-·-···-·-·····----···-····-···---··-·-··f-·--·--·-····-·-·---·~-·-·----·----··"--·-·-·-·-··-·----·-,·-----·------···-----~-------i

Crossing
Restriction

Measures

Route
AmendAltitude+
Traffic

Dire ct To

Route
AmendHeading

Route
AmendAltitude

Traffic Alert +
Immediate T"m

~-~:_:r.:ir_n_:~~:'..'.'.~~~---··----·--- _____:.:_~----- ______: :?_1:___L _____~..:.~!__ ---~:22______:.:_~L ______2_.8_6_ __
MR2 Time fin second s)

7.61

7.29

!

1.18

4 .86

2 .64

1.54

MR3 Time
Not captured because event occurs instantaneously in MUSIM
>-·-···----·--·-···-··---··----···---···········-·······-·······-·-e·············--········-·--·····----···--------·-····---··---·-····--·----------- --··--·-····-~------·--•
MR4 Time (in seconds)
4.43
1.16
4 .00
3 .02
4.21
2.48
Pilot Workload Rating
(l= Very low; 7 =Very high)

2 .25

2.2

ATC Acceptability Rating
(l= Not Acceptable; 7 =
Highly Acceptable)

6.10

6.15

l
!

i
!

I'
I

1.61

1.63

1.45

1.79

6.55

6.39

6 .38

6 .51

Main results/conclusions:
•

MR components can be extracted for many ATC clearances along with their
acceptability ratings
• Different MR components can occur in parallel/overlap with other MR components. As

a resa1t. tne entire 101R cannot s1rno1v oe comooeea ov aaa1na op au tne IVIR

UAS Pilot Performance
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UAS Pilot Performance
Full Mi ssion 1: The Effect of GCS Control Mode Interfa ces
>-- Objective: to examine the effects of three different command and control

(C2) interfaces on UAS pilots' ability to respond to ATC commands:
1. Waypoint-to-Waypoint only (WP; baseline)
2. Autopilot (quick input interface)
3. Manual (stick and throttle)
'r-

-·-----·-·----- ·····---- -- ---··· --·

I

i

I
Main results/conclusions:
• Waypoint-to-waypoint control mode demonstrated significant deficits in all of the pilot
measured response components compared to AP and M
• AP and M had significantly shorter compliance times overall than WP
• These results provide the initial database of expected pilot response time distributions,
which will be critical to determining the Minimum Operational Performance Standards
for UAS in the NAS
• Acceptability of C2 interfaces depends on the allowable response times given

eqa1ptt1e11c per101111a11ee spee111eat1011s tl.e., sensors , a1tc1a1c per1or111a11ce, eec.J

ATC Performance
•

Key Issues for ATC Performance
o Lost link and other UAS-specific contingency procedures
o Command and control and voice latencies

•

Simulation Experiments Examining UAS ATC Performance:
o Part Task Simulation 3 - Contingency Management
• Fern, L., Rorie, R. C., & Shively, R. J. (in press) . UAS contingency manag ement: the
effect of different procedures on ATC in civil airspace operations. Proceedings of
the 14th Annual A/AA Aviation, Technology, Integration and Operations
Conference, Atlanta, GA, June 16-20.

o Measured Response B - Controller Acceptability
• Vu, K. L.. Morales, G., Chiappe, D .. Strybel. T. z.. Battiste, V.. Shively, J.. & Buker,
T. J. (2013) . Influence of UAS pilot communication and executio n delay on
controller's acceptability ratings of UAS-ATC interactions. Proceedings of the 32nd
Digital Avionics Systems Conference, Syracuse, NY. October 6-10.

10
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ATC Performance
Part Task 3: Impact of UAS Contingency Operations on ATC
~

Objective: to examine the effects of various, currently-employed UAS
contingency procedures on sector safety and efficiency, and ATC workload.
o Four contingency procedures compared to no contingency
o T~o main categories of contingencies: lost link and critical systems

Cl

Baseline

N/A

C2

Lo st Link

Return to base

1 min

C3

Lost Link

Return to base

8 min

C4

Lo st Link

Maintain pre-programmed
course , return to mission
altitude

1 min

cs

Drop In Oil
Pressure

N/A

Land at e mergency site

Immediate

Main results/conclusions:
• Contingency procedures had no significant effect on objective measures of sector
safety or efficiency; none differed significantly from baseline (no contingency)
• No significant differences in self-reported workload or situation awareness of the ATC
participants
• Participants preferred procedures that minimized deviations and/or provided them with
sufficient time to manage nearby aircraft in preparation for pre-planned deviations

• H1an11ants neea ror stanaara ana oreaictaoie continoencv broceaures

ATC Performance
Measured Response B: Effect of Pilot Communication and
~ Objective: to determine ~.e,ceY!j19a~~Melays, execution delays, and
delay predictability impact ATC acceptability ratings of UAS pilot responses.
Conventional Pilots (MR

UAS Pilots (MR 1)
1 .0

!Si
c: O.B
1ii
~ 0 .6

Main
results/conclusions:

c:

E 04
0

~

02

0..

Constant
Short

Constant
Long

Var1able

Constant
Short

Condition

Constant
Long

Var1al

Condition

UAS Pilots (MR 2)

Conventional Pilots (MR ;

1 .0

1.0

0 .8

-·1

J

0 .6

a

.E 0 .8

111

~

06

c:

E o.4

0 .4

~0 2

0.2

0..

0 .0
Constant
Short

Com;;tant
Lo ng

Condition

Var1abla

Constant
Sho rt

C onstant
Long

Varia1

Condition

ATC acceptability ratings
were driven mainly by the
verbal latencies.
• Short UAS verbal
latencies averaging
2 .lOs were mostly
acceptable to ATC
• Long UAS verbal
latencies averaging
5.48s were not as
acceptable
Execution latencies and the
predictability of the delays
had less of an influence on
ATC acceptability ratings

P\esalts µ1 ovtde a Daselli re
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Objective I: GCS Guidelines Development
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 228 :
Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Unmanned Aircraft
System for Detect and Avoid (DAA) and Command and Control (C2)
HSI is currently leading the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) requirements for
the DAA and C2 working groups of the MOPS
Potential HMI MOPS Requirements, Recommendations or Impacts will address:
o

o
o

o

Displays
• minimum information
• advanced decision aiding/pilot guidance
• monitoring and control of C2 links
Self Separation and Collision Avoidance Alerting
Control interfaces
• Levels of automation
• Effect on pilot performance, C2 links
Visual (i.e .. camera/out-the-window) information requirements by phase of flight

Phase I MOPS due July 2016
General GCS Requirements
o

Will include those requirements not covered within the DAA and C2 sections of the
SC-228 MOPS
o To be published as a NASA report
l3

Objective II: Prototype Development
The Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) will serve as the prototype GCS for the
UAS Integration into the NAS Project
o
o
o

Robust, flexible interface
Multi-UAS control with VSCS has been tested in simulation and flight by AFRL
STANAG 4586 Compliant

Current UAS in the NAS version includes:
o
o
o

Single UAS control
NAS-compatible database (low- and high- altitude charts with navigational
aids/"fixes")
Integrated traffic display

Vigilanl Spiril Contro l Stalion (AFRURHJ . Distribution A: Approved for public release, dis tribution unhm,ted. 88ABW Cleared 3118120 13 : 88ABW ·2013 -1303
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Summary of HSI Activities
•

Information Requirements:
o Single searchable database combining three separate analyses:
• Phase of Flight
• Functional (e.g., aviate/control, manage, avoid, etc.)
• Evaluation of existing Federal Air Regulations (FARs)

•

Simulation Experiments:
o Pilot Performance
• Part Task Simulation 1- Baseline Compliance
• Measured Response A - Response to ATC Clearances
• Full Mission Simulation 1 - Command and Control Interfaces
o ATC Performance
• Part Task Simulation 3 - Contingency Management
• Measured Response B - Pilot Communication and Execution
Delay

•
•

Objective I: GCS Guidelines
Objective II: Prototype Development
15

•
•

Phase 2 Activities

Simulation experiments to focus on DAA requirements:
o Part Task Simulation 4:
• Minimum display requirements
• Advanced information and pilot guidance
• Stand alone versus integrated displays
o Part Task Simulation 5:
• Evaluation of additional DAA displays
o Full Mission Simulation 2 :
• Evaluation of boundary between self-separation, collision avoidance
and autonomous collision avoidance

•

Flight Tests to validate prototype
displays in operationally relevant
environment
o ACAS Xu Flight Test NOV 2014
o Flight Test 3 JUL 2015
o Flight Test 4 APR 2016

JG
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